Recent studies indicate that the number of terrorist incidents is declining while their lethality is increasing. This trend in casualty rates has raised the rhetoric on terrorism leading to claims that a new form of terrorism has emerged over the last thirty years. The -new terrorism‖ is defined by a tendency towards maximum destruction and a pronounced religious motivation. The question is whether or not the new terrorism is actually driving current trends in terrorist violence? This study examines casualty rates by terrorist groups categorized by their ideologies and finds that trends in terrorist violence are not being driven by the new terrorism per se. Instead, all forms of terrorism are more violent generally, and variations of ethno-national terrorism are the most violent specifically.
upon religious symbolism to recruit for and sustain their movements. Are Pape's findings restrictive to suicide terrorism exclusively, or is the finding broader to include all types of terrorist activity? More precisely, are the academic and policy communities over-attributing current trends in terrorism to Islamic fundamentalism, and under-attributing the importance of unresolved ethno-national conflicts around the world?
This study attempts to answer these questions in the following way. First I will review the literature on current trends in terrorist activity and the perception that terrorism today is of a new variety and that it is religiously motivated. The second part of this study briefly outlines the content of a mixed ethno-national/religious form of terrorism (as described by Pape) that is distinct from other forms of terrorism, especially the new terrorism. Part three describes a classification system for terrorist groups including pure and mixed ideological categories.
Finally, this study analyzes terrorist incidents and casualty rates corresponding to the ideological categories.
The New Terrorism: Discussion and Critique
The assertion that current trends in terrorism are directly attributable to a rise in religious terrorism, and specifically Islamic Fundamentalism, emerges from a few core empirical findings.
These findings are best illustrated by Enders and Sandler (2000) who note a seventeen percent increase in the lethality of terrorist incidents per quarter during the post-Cold War era as compared to the proceeding two decades. 4 Enders and Sandler (2006) also demonstrate that terrorist activity is emanating more from the Middle East and Asia, where Islamic religious communities are more concentrated. 5 Meanwhile, Bruce Hoffman (1998) notes that in 1995, groups with a religious characterization or motivation grew in number from one-third to 46 percent of active international terrorist groups, and these groups are responsible for 25 percent of terrorist attacks and 58 percent of terrorist fatalities. 6 The increasing lethality of terrorist attacks is located within a specifically defined historical period that begins with the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) . 7 All evidence combined leads David
Rapoport to conclude that in the late 1970s and early 1980s the -Third Wave‖ of terrorism is superseded by a -Fourth Wave‖. 8 This Fourth Wave of terrorism is akin what other scholars refer to today as a -New Terrorism‖.
The fourth wave of terrorism is characterized by several noticeable features. First, terrorism in the third wave is defined by a predominance of ethno-national terrorism where the group seeks secularly defined goals of national autonomy or independence without a qualifying condition (for instance, that any new state be religiously ruled). Meanwhile, the fourth wave of terrorism is characterized by a predominance of terrorist groups that draw more significantly on religious interpretations and goals as the core justifications for terrorist action. 9 Take note, that
Rapoport's characterization of waves of terrorism does not suggest that all terrorist activity is exclusively ethno-national (3 rd wave) or religious (4 th wave), but that in these periods one form is more dominant than others. Second, Islamic religious groups dominate, but they are not the exclusive threat; racially motivated groups (Neo-Nazi groups) and cult terrorist (like Aum Shinrikyo) groups share the stage. 10 Third, the fourth wave of terrorism is ushered in by the
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the beginning of the new Muslim
Century that is believed to bring forth a redeemer.
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Looking further into the nature of the Fourth Wave of terrorism, we note that the characterization of terrorism is particularly ominous regarding the terrorists and their intentions. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are defined in part by tendencies to ignore the counterproductive limits of violence and remove all constraints on terrorist activity. 14 The new terrorism, by the sheer lethality of terrorist acts, is defined by its tendency towards mass casualty incidents.
In addition to the lethality of the new terrorism, there is a tendency to further define it by its exclusively religious dimensions. 15 The treatment of religion is very different than in the past.
Terrorist groups in the past did not emphasize millenarian ideals and goals of bringing forth a messiah. Today that religious distinction is elevated to ever important levels on par with the Huntington-like -Clash of Civilizations.‖ The ideas of martyrdom are deeply infused within the new terrorism erasing any potential to articulate and diplomatically address a political program.
In simple terms, the new terrorism is defined by its vision of the world that Islam and the West are culturally incompatible and cannot coexist within the same geographic space.
The other defining characteristics of the new terrorism are fairly simple: (i) its networked nature, and (ii) its reliance on asymmetric methods of engagement. The networked nature of the new terrorism means the organization(s) are rather independent of a core or central command.
Independence does not imply complete autonomy, or lack or coordination. Rather, as in Bruce
Hoffman's characterization, the al-Qaeda leadership (Osama bin Laden) serves as a -venture capitalist of terrorism‖ or a CEO that moves available resources to independent cells conducting operations that are consistent with al-Qaeda's long-term strategic plans. 16 The terrorist cells are interconnected through networks of communication, but technically each cell is its own operational unit, and is encouraged to raise its own money and fund its own operations. 17 The new terrorism is not a single organization that is directing all its energies at the United States and the West. The new terrorism is more accurately a loose association of groups with like-minded interests and targets. Finally, the asymmetric engagement does not distinguish the new terrorism from other forms of terrorism as much as it demonstrates that, tactically, the new terrorism will operate as other generations of terrorism, by attacking its target indirectly. This is the hallmark of terrorist action that groups cannot stand toe-to-toe with their opponents so they attack at points of vulnerability and attempt to create socio-political pressure on the target government in order to force capitulation to the terrorist demands.
Overall, the new terrorism is seen as more threatening than terrorism in previous eras. by its religious content requires some qualification. Perhaps we need to specify mixed category groups and factor them in separately from other forms of right-wing/religious groups in order to accurately assess terrorist threats.
A second problem with the new terrorism designation is that the networked structures of the new terrorism somehow distinguish it from others eras of terrorism. groups may adopt left-wing ideologies as part of larger movements to establish an independent state ordered on socialist or communist principles. In sum, it is possible that a large portion of terrorist activity is attributable to mixed ideological groups.
A Typology of Terrorist Groups
If we accept the notion that the universe of active terrorist groups includes groups with pure ideological goals and groups with combined or mixed ideological goals (that is to say crossover groups), then the terrorist universe is indeed more complicated than we may have previously admitted to. To begin, the traditional view of the terrorism universe assumes a three point model:
Left-Wing (LW); Ethno-National (EN); Right-Wing/Religious (RWR). 
Pure Categories
Our discussion begins with the pure categories of terrorism: Left-Wing, Ethno-National, and Right-Wing and Religious terrorist groups express a core philosophy entrenched in counter-enlightenment ideas that society is in a general state of moral decay, and has drifted from its core values and morals that undergird all society. Action (terrorist or otherwise) will invoke some prophecy like bringing forth a messiah, or usher in a new millennium that reflects the values of the group. 38 Fulfilling the prophecy offers some divine sanction for the group's actions. 39 Often the constituent community is defined as part of the target audience as constituents are suffering from delusions and must be awakened to fulfill their destiny. Overall, society must be herded back to the pure life.
There are three subcategories of right-wing and religious terrorism. First is the Fundamentalist terrorist group, which is defined largely by an anti-globalization perspective.
The fundamentalist group sees globalization as a reflection of secularism over the vaunted values of traditional society. 40 The overall desire is to bring about a new rule (domestically, regionally, 
Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders or Al-Qaeda. Second is the Racial or Ethnic
Superiority terrorist group. Racial terrorism draws upon a variation of the counter-enlightenment ideas related to the prophecy or millenarian goals of a racially defined group that believes any change in the balance of power (especially the balance that favors the racial group) will contradict the natural order. The existence of the group in society and its place in society reflects the natural (or religiously defined) order of the universe. 41 Examples of racial superiority terrorism include the Bavarian Liberation Army, the Ku Klux Klan, and Kahana Organization (U.S.). The final subcategory of right-wing and religious terrorism is the Cult terrorist group. The cult terrorist group is a variation of right-wing/religious terrorism that invokes the most apparent millenarian and messianic messages. Beliefs are tightly related to religious messages and texts exclusively with all other social or political goals removed. In essence the cult group does not advocate a specific social or political message. The cult group believes that its members are followers of the true faith, and the righteousness of this true faith will be demonstrated by some cataclysmic event that annihilates all non-group members. 42 In the post-apocalyptic world, members of the cult terrorist group will survive and become dominant. Dominance is assured by remaining faithful to the true religion. Examples of cult terrorist groups include Aum Shin Rikyo,
and The Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda).
Mixed Categories
The two mixed category forms of terrorism are Left-Wing/Ethno-National, and Right Wing- The typology of terrorist groups presented here is not the only attempt, nor necessarily the most common categorical system used. Any effort to establish categories of terrorism have historically been as difficult as defining terrorism. 43 For example, some authors have attempted to use tactical operations as a method for classification, using categories like hijacking, bombing, and assassination forms of terrorism. 44 Another example is to classify terrorism via tactics and targets, resulting in categories like Mass Terror, Random Terror, or Focused Random Terror. 45 Such systems of classification are useful as they direct attention to likely targets, events, and campaign strategies, which can then be used to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
for handling terrorist situations. However, terrorists are limited only by imagination and available targets, so tactical operations do evolve over time. To rely exclusively on tactical operations to classify terrorism would require constant updating and the list could grow to include endless categories limiting the utility of this classification system and our understanding of terrorism. The utility of a typology then is determined by its ability to organize the universe of terrorist activity and advance some understanding of terrorism as well.
The Origin of Terrorist Threats: Trends and Analysis
For the purposes of this study, the definition of terrorism conforms to the definition used by . 49 The data set records approximately 40 or more variables per terrorist incident including the number of people wounded, number of people killed, and the first and second group involved in a terrorist event. Total casualty rates are calculated by adding the total number of people wounded and killed. To limit the scope of the study, and target terrorist casualties more accurately, incidents with 1 or more casualties were selected for inclusion in the study. This is consistent with the method employed by Enders and Sandler to capture incident specific measures of casualties. 50 This limitation also reflects stark reality about terrorism; that being there are casualties in only 27percent of all terrorist attacks.
While limiting to the scope of the study, the potential sample still includes 3316 cases.
To capture mass casualty terrorist incidents, the data are limited only to incidents with 32 or more casualties. The goal was to follow the pattern set out by Quillen to capture: - [a] number…high enough to genuinely reflect the devastation wrought by such attacks, but low enough to yield a useful sample given the traditional terrorist tendency to scare rather than kill.‖ 51 At the same time I decided to avoid the arbitrary nature of Quillen, to simply choose a number. Instead the number (32) is a reflection of the average mean for all terrorist incidents with one or more casualties (11.77) plus one half standard deviation above the mean: σ=40.07891
.5(σ)=20.039455
.5(σ) + 11.77=31.809455 (or 32)
The outcome of 32 casualties is actually consistent with Quillen's arbitrary choice of +25
casualties. From this measure of mass casualty incidents the analysis will potentially include 233 cases.
A quick note is required regarding the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. These events are certainly rare in the normal distribution of casualty rates per terrorist attack. Being rare does not mean that such events should be ignored or quickly dismissed. A body of research has emerged to suggest that events like 9/11, though rare, do not deviate so much from what we observe in terrorist events that they should not be dismissed exclusively as outliers. 52 At the same time, practicality prevents a complete inclusion of the 9/11 events in this study. In the ITERATE dataset the 9/11 attacks are listed as four separate events. The first two events-the World Trade Center-lists total casualties as unknown. Trying to determine the number of people on each plane, plus the number of people in each building that were casualties is impossible. The other two events (Pentagon and Pennsylvania) do have known casualty rates (189 and 56 respectively) and are included in the data analysis provided below. This is a limitation in the data.
Terrorist groups are placed into ideological categories by a code from 1-9 in the we cannot draw a reliable conclusion from this portion of the study.
( Table 2 about there is a spike in ethno-national terrorism, followed by a spike in left-wing terrorism in 1998.
Beginning in 2000 we observe a distinct rise in RWR fundamentalist terrorist followed by a smaller yet noticeable rise in casualty rates for left-wing terrorist groups, and then dramatic spikes and a general upward trend in casualty rates for ethno-national terrorism. Taken The findings of this study confirm that mixed ideological categories, specifically RWREN (Fundamentalist) groups account for the highest average casualty rates per incident for all terrorist incidents that produce one or more casualty in the Post-Islamic Revolution period.
This finding is consistent with Pape's depiction of the conflict substructure that supports suicide terrorism.
When analyzing trends in casualty rates between the different types of terrorist groups, the data suggest that all forms of terrorism are becoming more violent. This finding applies to ethno-national forms of terrorism including the mixed category groups (LWEN and RWREN Fundamentalist), and it applies to the classical categories of terrorism (LW, EN, RWR Fundamentalist). Taken together all findings suggest that terrorism generally is becoming more violent, and that the mixed category right-wing and religious/ethno-national terrorist group is the most violent. Moreover, the findings of this study do not support the conclusion that the trends in terrorism, especially the rise in casualty rates, are driven by a new terrorism. Perhaps the better way to assess the trends is to simply note that terrorism is becoming more violent over all, ethnonational forms of terrorism are the most prevalent in the number of attacks and in casualty rates. 
